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Abstract. Recently, online video chat services are becoming increas-
ingly popular. While experiencing tremendous growth, online video chat
services have also become yet another spamming target. Unlike spam
propagated via traditional medium like emails and social networks, we
find that spam propagated via online video chat services is able to draw
much larger attention from the users. We have conducted several ex-
periments to investigate spam propagation on Chatroulette - the largest
online video chat website. We have found that the largest spam cam-
paign on online video chat websites is dating scams. Our study indicates
that spam carrying dating or pharmacy scams have much higher click-
through rates than email spam carrying the same content. In particular,
dating scams reach a clickthrough rate of 14.97%. We also examined and
analysed spam prevention mechanisms that online video chat websites
have designed and implemented. Our study indicates that the preven-
tion mechanisms either harm legitimate user experience or can be easily
bypassed.
1 Introduction
Online video chat services such as Chatroulette [5], Omegle [17], myYearbook
Live [16], Tinychat [21] and vChatter [22] have been gaining popularity over
the recent years. Though video chat services are still new, the number of their
users has significantly increased (over 500% since 2010). The world’s largest
online video chat system - Chatroulette - claims that there are 20 million unique
visitors per month and approximately 35,000 online users at any given time [20].
A common feature of such online video chat systems is to pair strangers
from around the world for webcam based conversations. During a conversation,
a participant clicks a “Next” button to move on to a new partner. This behavior
is also described as “spin”. Online video chat websites use Adobe Flash 10.04 to
display video and access the users’ webcam. Adobe Flash’s peer-to-peer network
capabilities via RTMFP allow all video, audio and text streams to be exchanged
directly between user computers, without involving the server and hence without
using any server bandwidth.
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Fig. 1. A typical online video chat service.
A key problem in these video chat websites is that a large number of spam
bots are abusing them to propagate spam. Generally, spammers execute volumi-
nous copies of spam bots on many computers, and propagate unauthorized ad-
vertising information or phishing scams. These spam bots drive away legitimate
advertising business, thus limiting such websites from obtaining more economic
benefits. Furthermore, allowing spam bots to propagate scams on such websites
exposes video chat users to malicious threats. To eliminate these spam bots,
online video chat websites have developed and deployed their own prevention
mechanisms. Unfortunately, our experience on these video chat websites indi-
cated that the chances of encountering spam is still high. Take Chatroulette.com
as an example. Every 10∼20 spins include one spam. To understand the reason
why such spam is persistent on online video chat websites, we investigated the
characteristics of spam bots, revealed spamming workflow and examined video
chat websites’ prevention mechanisms. Exploring these is essential for helping on-
line video chat providers enhance their prevention mechanisms and subsequently
eliminate spam propagation. This paper provides an in-depth, empirical study
of spam in online, video chat services. Based on this study, the paper suggests
some prevention mechanisms.
Since online video chat systems employ a peer-to-peer architecture, monitor-
ing spam, and investigating their behavior and characteristics is an extremely
difficult task. Due to the absence of any centralized sever through which audio
and video stream passes, it is not possible to put any monitoring probe. In this
scenario, the only feasible solution is to collect data from a set of users who
are participating in these services. We have employed this solution by build-
ing a spam bot program, registering several domain names, advertising these
domain names via several spam bots, and recording the number of visits. Dur-
ing the experiments, our spam bots encountered chatters as well as other spam
bots that spammers created, and recorded corresponding conversation sessions.
Using these recorded session information along with Chatroulette web server
logs, we conducted several measures and analysis of spam. In addition, our own
spam bots are used for testing these spam prevention mechanisms of online video
chat websites. Our study found out the largest spam campaign in online video
chat websites is the spam carrying dating scams, which receives 14.97% of click-
through rate. In contrast, spam carrying pharmacy scams receive less attention
with at most 1.99% of clickthrough rate. Compared with pharmacy scams prop-
agating via email, spam carrying pharmacy scams propagating via online video
chat websites however is much more successful.
Using our deployment of spam bots in a small scale, not only do we witness
the success of video spam at enticing tens of thousands of users, but also we
examine online video chat websites’ spam prevention mechanisms. Suprisingly,
our spam bots can easily bypass the prevention mechanisms that Chatroulette
and myYearbook designed and implemented. Though Omegle’s spam preven-
tion mechanisms block our spam bots, we observe that their spam prevention
mechanisms also significantly harm user experience.
We summarize the contributions of this paper as follows.
– We have conducted several experiments on large scale and analysed the click-
through rate of spam on the world largest online video chat website - Cha-
troulette.
– We present the first in-depth look at spam on Chatroulette, finding that the
largest spam campaign is those carrying dating scams.
– We examine spam prevention mechanisms on the top three online video chat
websites, exposing the security flaws of these prevention mechanisms.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Secton 2 presents a brief
background on video chat wesbistes. Section 3 analyses the clickthrough rate of
spam and spam campaigns on a video chat website. Section 4 discusses the pre-
vention mechanisms that online video chat websites designed and implemented.
Section 5 discuesses some spam prevention suggestions, followed by conclusions
in Section 6
2 Background
Figure 1 illustrates how an online video chat service such as Chatroulette,
Omegle, or myYearbook works. A user first directs his/her web browser to the
URL of the video chat’s website to download its webpage (containing JavaScript,
HTML and Adobe Flash files). The webpage requests the connection with an-
other user from the video chat server, e.g. users Jane, Xuyang, Nina, John and
Mike are making this request in Figure 1 (a). The server then returns the (IP)
address of the computer host of another online user, in order to connect the
two users together. For example, the server pairs Jane and John together, and
Xuyang and Mike together in Figure 1(b). In most online video chat systems,
pairing of users is conducted at random among all the users who are online at
the same time. Therefore, the users do not know a priori the other person that
they will be connected with for video conversations. Once a pairing is done,
Adobe Flash code embedded within the page establishes a direct video session
(a peer-to-peer connection) with the computer host of the other user, sending
text, local camera and microphone data to the remote user while receiving that
remote user’s text, video and audio data. This is shown in Figure 1(c), where
Jane and John have a video chat session established and Xuyang and Mike have
a video chat session established. When a user clicks the “Next” button (user Lisa
in Figure 1(c)), the browser requests a new user and his/her computer host’s ad-
dress, thus establishing a new video chat session (Lisa and Nina in Figure 1(d)).
Note that the server is chiefly involved in pairing users together by supplying
their computer host addresses, and is not involved in relaying any video data.
2.1 Predicting Conversation Durations
When a user or his / her chatting partner clicks the “next” button, the user’s
web browser sends an HTTP post request to an online video chat server. By
maintaining the web server’s logs, an online video chat website can infer a user’s
conversation duration by analysing the timestamps of consecutive HTTP re-
quests. Take the example of the user Jane shown in Figure 1 where she sends an
HTTP request at 11:07:00 PM and starts a conversation with user John. After 45
seconds, John clicks “next” button, Jane’s web browser automatically sends an
HTTP request to Chatroulette server. Chatroulette server receives Jane’s HTTP
request at 11:07:45 PM and thus infers that the duration of Jane’s conversation
with John was 45 seconds.
2.2 Balancing Users’ Requests
For some online video chat websites such as Chatroulette and Omegle, there are
a large number of online users at any given time. For example, Chatroulette
has 20,000 to 30,000 users at any given time, which is similar to Omegle. To
balance such users’ requests, online video chat websites distribute users and
their HTTP requests to several servers. For example, Chatroulette used 4 to
6 web servers to process their users’ requests. Note that the number of web
servers relies on the number of online users. Since traffic balance is based on the
granularity of users, users who connect to one Chatroulette server cannot have a
conversation with others who connect to other Chatroulette servers. On average,
there are 4,000 to 5,000 users on each Chatroulette server. Since online video
chat users are randomly distributed across several web servers, the population
of the users on each Chatroulette server in terms of age, gender and location
remains approximately consistent.
2.3 Obtaining Snapshots
In online video chat services, users’ text, video and audio data are transmitted
via Adobe Flash’s peer-to-peer networks. A few online video chat websites use
HTTP pulling techniques to peroidically collect their users’ snapshots. Using
HTTP pulling techniques helps online video chat websites censor inappropriate
video content (e.g., pornographic content and unauthorized advertisement) [4].
3 Spam on Chatroulette
Based on our extensive observation on online video chat websites, we noticed
spammers typically use two approaches to perform spam propagation. One, a
spammer uses a virtual webcam software to play an animated GIF image where
a corresponding spam URL is explicitly displayed. Another approach is that
a spammer replays a pre-recorded phishing video where an attractive woman
sits in front of a webcam and types on her keyboard. Along with the phishing
video, the spammer also runs a chatbot program that allows a spammer’s spam
bot to have a capacity to text chat with his chatting partner. A victim may
mistakenly think that he/she is having a conversation with a real human chatting
partner. Therefore, when a chat bot program sends the victim a spam URL, the
victim may trust the chat bot and thus visit the spam URL. In this paper, we
describe these two spamming approaches as image spam bot and video spam bot
approach, respectively.
3.1 Methodology
There is no way to fully monitor spam bots and measure spam clickthrough
rates because of Adobe Flash’s peer-to-peer networks. To investigate spam in
the context of online video chat websites, we registered several domain names,
built our own spam bots and engaged in spamming activities. To avoid nega-
tive impact on online video chat services associated with our spam experiments,
we displayed an explicit notification to those visitors who our spam bots co-
erced into our spam experiment websites. In our notification page, we described
our experiments and re-directed visitors back to online video chat websites in
5 seconds. Our spam experiments were conducted on the largest online video
chat website - Chatroulette due to the following considerations. First, the Cha-
troulette development team provides us with an internal data traces. We can use
these data traces along with our spam bot data traces to conduct our spam anal-
ysis. Second, Alexa.com [1] reports show that online video chat websites such
as Chatroulette, Omegle, TinyChat, myYearbook have similar populations in
terms of visitors’ age, ethnicity, education levels, and gender. Because these are
major factors that affect the clickthrough rate of a spam URL, our experiments
on Chatroulette are representative for other online video chat websites.
We built our spam bots with four major functions. (1) Our spam bot has the
capacity of chatting with other Chatroulette users and playing a pre-recorded
video. (2) Our spam bot has the capacity of taking snapshots of Chatroulette
users while connecting to other Chatroulette users. (3) Our spam bot has the
capacity of logging conversations. (4) Our spam bot can also log other Cha-
troulette users’ IP addresses. All of these logs along with Chatroulette internal
data traces are used for our spam study.
3.2 Clickthrough
Our prior experiences with Chatroulette and Omegle indicate that the most com-
monly seen spam was the spam carrying online dating scams. Therefore, our first
experiment focused on measuring the clickthrough rate of online dating spam.
Though the chance of encountering pharmacy spam is much lower than that of
seeing dating spam on Chatroulette and Omegle, we still designed our second
experiment to measure the clickthrough rate of pharmacy spam on Chatroulette.
The reason to do this is to investigate whether an online video chat website is a
highly successful platform for coercing users to visit a spam URL. We compared
the results of our pharmacy spam experiments with the results presented in [12]
where pharmacy spam is sent through emails.
Table 1. Spam experiments and spam bots
Group Spam bot Spam unique chatter # unique visitor # Avg. conversation # per min.
1 image dating 811,317 98,113 3.76 per spam bot
2 image pharmacy 1,671,840 12,960 7.74 per spam bot
3 video dating 538,559 80,639 2.49 per spam bot
4 video pharmacy 985,091 19,636 4.56 perspam bot
We executed 20 copies of our spam bot program on 20 Amazon’s EC2 micro
instances with Windows installations for one month period. We divided these
20 spam bots into 4 groups, and each group has 5 spam bots running the same
spam experiment. To receive different audiences for different spam experiments,
each of the four groups performs a corresponding spam experiment on a different
Chatroulette server. Table 1 describes four spam experiments that are assigned to
four groups and the corresponding spam bots that four groups perform. Similar
to other video spam bots on Chatroulette, our video spam bots use a pre-recoded
video with a fully-clothed young woman sitting in front a webcam and typing
on her keyboard. Our video spam bots carrying dating and pharmacy spam
used the same chatting scripts as those that other Chatroulette spammers used.
Similarly, our image spam bots carrying dating spam used a similar image that
other Chatroulette spammers used but with a different spam URL on it. As we
did not find any spammers use image spam bots to send pharmacy spam, here
we used an image that the notorious spam brand - canadian pharmacy [3] - used
and edit it with our spam URL.
Table 1 shows the results of our spam experiments over a one-month period.
Surprisingly, dating spam obtains tremendous audiences and high clickthrough
rates (12.09% as well as 14.97% for video and image spam bot, respectively).
These high clickthrough rates of dating spam imply that Chatroulette users
engaged in their service with the purpose of looking for either virtual friend-
ship or online dating opportunities. Unsurprisingly, notorious pharmacy spam
has lower clickthrough rates than dating spam. However, this was by no means
unsuccessful. Comparing with prior pharmacy spam carried via emails with a
clickthrough rate of 0.00303% [12], pharmacy spam carried by video spam bots
on Chatroulette had an approximately 650 times higher clickthrough rate than
pharmacy spam on emails (0.00303% vs. 1.99%). In addition to these high click-
through rates, our another interesting observation is that video spam bots typi-
cally achieved slightly higher clickthrough rates than image spam bots, especially
when carrying the same spam. The reason behind this may be because of the
characteristics of video spam bots. Since a video spam bot has the function of a
chat bot, it has a higher possibility of persuading a victim to visit a spam URL
by using its pre-defined chatting script.
Different from email spam that can be efficiently delivered to end users in
a large scale, the breadth of spam delivery is dependent upon the number of
chatters that a spam bot encounters. However, the number of chatters that a
spam bot can encounter is not the only factor that determines how many visitors
a spam URL can obtain. As shown in Table 1, the clickthrough rate of a spam
URL is highly correlated to the average number of conversations per minute.
That is to say, the longer a spam bot can have a conversation with a chatter, the
more likely that a spam URL would be visited. It is quite obvious that a high
clickthrough rate is not the goal that a spammer expect to achieve. Rather they
strive to trick as many visitors as possible to visit their spam URL within the
limited time. As a result, the most efficient spam bot program for advertising
online dating spam are those image spam bots. Our prior observations echoed
with this findings, i.e., image spam bots carrying online dating spam are more
commonly used than video spam bots.
3.3 Spam and Affiliate Program
Using Chatroulette data traces along with the log data that our spam bots
collected during our spam experiments, we first performed statistical analysis
for those spam on Chatroulette. Chatroulette data traces contain 32,441 online
users’ snapshots and their corresponding IP addresses, covering all online users
from 4:52:33 PM to 5:23:42 PM on 29 September 2011. We selected all snapshots
which include explicit spam URLs. We labeled those IP addresses associated
with selected snapshots as image spam bots’ IP addresses. Since video spam
bots used text messages to carry spam URLs via Adobe Flash’s peer-to-peer
networks, users’ snapshots and corresponding IP addresses of Chatroulette data
traces cannot help us identify those video spam bots on Chatroulette. To address
this problem, we searched for those IP addresses that appear in Chatroulette
data traces from our spam bots’ logs. If the IP addresses also appear in our
spam bots’ logs, we extracted the corresponding text conversations and examine
whether URLs are included in the text conversations. If an URL was detected, we
labeled this corresponding IP address as an IP address which hosts video spam
bots. Though the overlapping IP addresses between Chatroulette data traces
and spam bots’ logs are just a few, this could still help us identify most of video
spam bots because spammers typically run their spam bots 24 by 7.
Table 2. Spam categories on Chatroulette.
Category Spam URL # IP address #
Dating 38 200
Pharmacy 4 25
Malware 3 11
Make money fast 2 6
Hiring webcam models 1 2
Aggregating all IP addresses that host either video spam bots or image spam
bots, we obtained a list of 244 unique IP addresses advertising 48 unique spam
URLs. Table 2 categorizes these 48 spam URLs into five categories. Unsurpris-
ingly, dating spam was the largest spam campaign on Chatroulette and is ad-
vertised by 200 unique IP addresses. The number of pharmacy spam, to our
surprise, was much lower on Chatroulette though our experiments show it can
reach higher clickthrough rates ( see Table 1). To explain this, we revisited Ta-
ble 1 and observed that the 5 video spam bots carrying pharmacy spam need a
month to encounter approximately 1 million chatters and only coerced approxi-
mately 20 thousand chatters into visiting a spam URL. Apparently, this is not as
efficient as what email spam does, which can send pharmacy spam to 350 million
audiences at one time and obtain approximately 10 thousand visitors in a couple
of days [12]. We further investigated the hosts of the spam bots found on Cha-
troulette by looking up the 244 spam IP addresses. To our surprise, we found
that 224 out 244 IP addresses come from commercial cloud servers including
Amazon.com [2], Rackspace.com [18], Slicehost.com [19] and Godaddy.com [11].
Different from those email spammers who use the power of botnets to adver-
tise their spam URLs, spammers on Chatroulette use commercial computation
resources to run their business.
Table 3. Spam URLs belonging to affiliate program streamate.com.
Spam URL IP address Checkout URL
randomdatingservice.com 69.90.89.126 https://secure.streamate.com/signup/?AFNO=1-0-627111-348978...
chatroulettehof.com 69.90.89.126 https://secure.streamate.com/signup/?AFNO=1-0-609824-344299...
omeglegirls.com 69.90.89.126 https://secure.streamate.com/login.php?AFNO=1-609824-JD-3-1-300...
omeglevideos.com 69.90.89.126 https://secure.streamate.com/login.php?AFNO=1-627111-JD-3-1-300...
xxxzap.com 184.168.174.1 https://secure.streamate.com/signup/?xsid=XGC&AFNO=1-623506-JD-3-6-355...
babezap.com 184.168.63.1 https://secure.streamate.com/signup/?xsid=XGC&AFNO=1-625703-JD-3-6-355...
scenecams.com 46.252.206.1 https://secure.streamate.com/signup/?xsid=XGC&AFNO=1-618951-JD-3-6-355...
chatraw.com 50.63.36.1 https://secure.streamate.com/signup/?xsid=XGC&AFNO=1-629669-JD-3-6-355...
(a) A spam website template. (b) A check out page of streamate.com.
Fig. 2. A website that a spam URL links to.
Since 80% of spam URLs include online dating services, we further inves-
tigated these online dating websites by visiting all 38 dating spam URLs. The
purpose of our investigation was to see whether those online dating spam are
unauthorzied advertisement or online dating scams. Taking the affiliate program
of streamate.com as an example, we observed 8 out of 38 spam URLs including
online dating services belong to this affiliate program. Table 3 shows these 8 spam
URLs. To dissect this affiliate program, we first revealed the spam workflow. Sim-
ilar to pharmacy spam introduced in [14], spammers first use streamate.com’s
advertising templates to create their own websites. They then registered several
domain names, associate these domain names with their websites and use spam
bots to advertise their domain names on online video chat websites. When a
victim visits a spammer’s website, he/she sees a page that presents a few things
which appear to be real, but actually are not. Figure 2(a) shows an practical
example. First, an online dating users’ number appears on the right corner of the
page. However, after examining the page’s source codes, we easily found that the
number is generated by a JavaScript function below rather than actual online
users.
1var usersonline = function ( ) {
2 var randomnumber=Math . f loor (Math .random( ) ∗101)
3 var time=Math . f loor (Math .random( ) ∗2101)
4 totalusers = totalusers + randomnumber
5 document . getElementById ( ’ u s e r c o un t ’ ) . innerHTML = totalusers ;
6 setTimeout ( ’ u s e r s o n l i n e ( ) ; ’ , time ) ;
7}
Second, there comes what appears to be a live chat window, which turns out
to be a pre-recorded 20-second video of a chatter pretending to engage in a
conversation with the victim. If the victim attempts to type into the fake chat
field, the page refreshed with a totally different video of a totally different chatter
and a system message - ”Your Message was not sent! To Chat you must click
’VERIFY’ to verify your age.“ - will post on the chatting text window. If the
victim clicks ”VERIFY“ button, he/she will be redirected to a check out page
provided by affiliate program streamate.com. Affiliate program streamate.com
uses affiliate IDs to identify their affiliates. Therefore, when a victim is redirected
to the check out page of streamate.com, a corresponding affiliate ID is also passed
to streamate.com. As shown in Figure 2(b), this affiliate ID usually appears on
the victim’s address bar. Table 3 reveals the affiliate ID that each spam URL
is associated with (i.e., AFNO). As some spammers engage in multiple affiliates
to increase their economic benefits, an interesting observation in Table 3 is that
the first four spam URLs are associated with the same IP address.
In addition to those spam websites, we further conduct a meta analysis of
streamate.com. To determine whether streamate.com is a reliable dating service
provider, we searched the Internet and find out several evidences concerning
credit card frauds [9][6][15] (to name a few), indicating that affiliate program
streamate.com is an online dating scam.
3.4 Spam Bot Prediction
Comparing with 32,441 online users, 244 users are associated with spam bots,
which seems trivial. However, our experiences on Chatroulette and Omegle in-
dicate that a chatter typically encounters a spam bot for every 10∼20 spins
on average. It is apparent that spammers execute multiple copies of their spam
bot programs on each machine. To predict the average number of spam bot
programs running on each machine, we analyse Chatroulette’s web server log.
Taking a one-hour Chatroulette web server log as an example, we observe that
one Chatroulette server receives 350 HTTP requests in every second on aver-
age (see Figure 3). Using this log information, we predict the number of copies
of spam bot programs running on Chatroulette. Let n be the number of spam
bot programs which send HTTP request to Chatroulette server at any given
time. Then the probability that a user encounters a spam bot when he/she
sends HTTP request to Chatroulette server is n350 . The probability that a user
encounters one spam bot at the ith spin (p) then can be described as following.
p = 1− (1− n
350
)i (1)
Assuming n = 50, we can calculate the probabilities that a user encounters a
spam bot program at the 10th and the 20th spin are approximately 79% and
95%, respectively. Recall that Table 1 shows the average shortest conversation is
7.75 seconds per spam bot program (e.g., an image spam bot program carrying
pharmacy scams can talk to 7.74 chatters in every minute), while the average
longest conversation is 24.10 seconds per spam bot program (e.g., a video spam
bot program carrying dating spam can talk to 2.49 chatters in every minute).
Based on these information, we predict that the lower and the upper bound of
the total number of spam bot programs running on one Chatroulette server are
388 and 1205. Note that this range 388∼1,205 only describes the total number
of spam bot program running on one Chatroulette server. Since there are 6
Chatroulette web servers in total, we estimated the total number of spam bot
programs hosting on Chatroulette are in the range of 2,328∼7,230. In other word,
each spammer’s machine runs 10∼30 spam bot programs.
Though our prediction above can well explain why a user can easily encounter
a spam bot in every 20 spins, our prediction is far exceeding our expectations.
According to our observation and experience, we found that Chatroulette has im-
plement and deployed an effective CAPTCHA mechanism that can detect those
spammers who attempt to execute multiple spam bots on a single machine. To
further verify the correctness of our prediction, we examine Chatroulette’s spam
prevention mechanism along with other spam prevention mechanisms that other
online video chat websites designed and implemented in the following section.
4 Prevention Mechanisms
To curb the abuses of spam, some online video chat websites design and im-
plement their own spam prevention mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge,
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Fig. 3. HTTP requests on a Chatroulette web server.
such websites include Chatroulette, Omegle and myYearbook. However, our ob-
servations on these websites indicate that there are still a great number of spam
on these websites. To find the reason for the abuses, we examine these preven-
tion mechanisms that are implemented on these online video chat websites and
analyse their security flaws. In addition, we also discuss the usability of state-
of-the-art mechanisms for spam bot prevention.
4.1 CAPTCHA based Prevention
Both Chatroulette and Omegle design and implement their own CAPTCHA
based prevention mechanisms to eliminate spam bots in their systems. The main
idea of their prevention mechanisms is to analyse the characteristics of users’
HTTP requests. When pre-defined spam characteristics are detected, CAPTCH
challenges will be sent to corresponding users, i.e., possible spammers.
Prevention Workflow Omegle’s CAPTCHA based spam prevention mecha-
nism is an IP-based spam prevention approach. It uses a pre-defined users’ HTTP
request pattern to determine whether a user is a spammer. Their pre-defined pat-
tern is based on two assumptions. (1) Every user connects to Omegle using an
unique IP address. (2) If a spammer executes multiple copies of a spam bot
program from a single machine, the frequency of the spammer’s HTTP requests
to Omegle servers is high. When Omegle servers receive HTTP requests from a
same IP address at a high frequency, Omegle invokes Google RECAPTCH API
sending a CAPTCHA challenge to the suspected IP address. Omegle does not
respond to HTTP requests from the suspected IP address until the CAPTCHA
challenge is correctly solved.
Similar to Omegle, Chatroulette’s spam prevention mechanism is also based
on a CAPTCHA technique. However, the pre-defined rule for triggering a CAPTCHA
challenge is different. Chatroulette’s prevention mechanism uses the number of
active HTTP sessions to determine whether a user is a possible spammer. When
a user connects to a Chatroulette web server for the first time, Chatroulette as-
signs a temporary session ID to the user. Therefore, when a spammer attempts
to establish multiple connections to Chatroulette servers, Chatroulette observes
multiple active sessions from a same IP address. Using this intuitive character-
istic, Chatroulette determines whether a CAPTCHA challenge needs to be sent
to an IP address. According to probes using our spam bots, we found out the
maximum threshold of the number of active sessions for triggering a CAPTCHA
challenge is equal to four. In other word, if there is an IP address associated with
four active sessions, a Chatroulette’s CAPTCHA challenge will be delivered to
the IP address.
Security Flaws Using 10 copies of our spam bot to examine Omegle’s spam
prevention mechanism, we observe our machine that executes these spam bot
programs receives a Google CAPTCHA and is temporarily blocked after our
spam bots are launched for one minute. To further verify that Omegle’s spam
prevention is based on IP addresses, we delete all the Local Shared Objects (LSO)
and find that our reconnection attempts failed. In addition, we also experiment
with another machine behind the same NAT and receive the same connection
failure. It is apparent that Omegle’s spam prevention mechanism is sufficiently ef-
fective for keeping spammer’s spam bots away from their system, especially when
a spammer attempts to execute several spam bot programs on a single machine.
However, a security flaw still exists when we experiment with a single spam bot
program advertising a spam URL on Omegle. Except for an image spam bot car-
rying pharmacy spam that receives a Google CAPTCHA challenge after being
launched for 17 minutues, we surprisingly observe that all four spamming combi-
nations used in our Chatroulette’s clickthrough experiments successfully bypass
Omegle’s spam prevention without experiencing Google CAPTCHA challenges
in a three-day experiment. The reason of this success is straightforward. Omegle
uses the frequency of user’s HTTP requests to distinguish a spammer. Tabel 1
shows that all our spam bots except the image bot carrying pharmacy spam
usually have longer conversations with users. As a result, Omegle cannot expect
our spam bots’ HTTP requests at a high frequency except the image spam bot
carrying pharmacy spam.
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Fig. 4. Distributions of human subjects’ and spam bots’ conversation durations.
In addition to the security flaws above, we also examine whether Omegle’s
prevention mechanism may harm their users’ experience if it is implemented by
an online video chat website such as Chatroulette. We extensively involve in
Chatroulette by having conversations with Chatroulette users. During a conver-
sation, a subjective Turing test is involved, which asks our subjects to flash a
peace sign or place their fingers upon their head. There are 5,702 subjects pass-
ing our Turing test in a one-month period. To support this study, Chatroulette
provides us with a data trace associated with these 5,702 subjects which includes
the conversation durations and snapshots of each subject. These subjects totally
conducted 1,105,320 conversations in a one-month period. We compare the con-
versation characteristics of these human subjects with those of our spam bots.
Figure 4 shows the probability distributions of human subjects’ conversation du-
rations and spam bots’ conversation durations in a log-log scale. An interesting
observation is that both human subjects and spam bots have more short conver-
sations than long ones. If Omegle’s prevention mechanism uses consecutive short
conversations to distinguish a spammer, it is highly likely to mistakenly suspect
a legitimate user to be a spammer because both human users and spammers
have more short conversations.
Compared with Omegle’s spam prevention mechanism, Chatroulette’s spam
prevention mechanism is easier to be bypassed. As Chatroulette uses the max-
imum threshold of the number of active sessions to trigger their CAPTCHA
challenges, a spammer can bypass Chatroulette’s spam prevention by sharing
a same session ID with all copies of his spam bot program. To verify this, we
execute 15 image spam bot programs carrying pharmacy spam on a single ma-
chine in a three-day period. Unsurprisingly, our three-day experiment receives
no Chatroulette’s CAPTCHA challenges.
4.2 Session based Prevention
Different from Chatroulette and Omegle, myYearbook design and implement a
complex session based prevention mechanism to curb the abuses of spam. Similar
to CAPTCHA based prevention, session based prevention cannot completely
stop spamming activities. However, myYearbook’s prevention mechanism may
effectively avoid multiple spam bot programs running on a single machine. It is
essential for reducing spamming activities because it increases both the difficulty
and economic cost of spamming activities.
myYearbook’s prevention mechanism involves a two-sided effort - a chatting
client side and myYearbook’s web server side. myYearbook’s chatting client is
implemented using Adobe Flash, JavaScript and HTML codes; myYearbook’s
server side is implemented using PHP. To dissect the session based prevention
mechanism, we download Flash applications, JavaScript and partial HTML codes
of myYearbook’s chatting client. Since myYearbook has not obfuscated and en-
crypted their Flash applications, we use Flash Decompiler Trillix [8] to decompile
myYearbook’s Flash applications and analyse myYearbook’s spam prevention
workflow.
Prevention Workflow We first dissect the workflow of myYearbook by observ-
ing the HTTP traffic between a chatting client and myyearbook.com. Though
myYearbook is a sign-in required onlive video chat service that requires each user
register an account on their website and uses his/her account to access myYear-
book service, all the HTTP traffic except for the traffic in the sign-in process
between the chatting client and myYearbook.com is through an unencrypted
channel (i.e., no HTTPS are applied). Figure 5 and 6 show the prevention work-
flow of myYearbook.
In Figure 5, a chatting client first sends an authentication request to myYear-
book.com. If the authentication process passes, several Javascript, Flash and
HTML files are downloaded to the chatting client. On the chatting client side,
the downloaded Flash code - MessageBridge.swf - is performed to check whether
Fig. 5. myYearbook Live! workflow when only one conversation session is established.
Fig. 6. myYearbook Live! workflow when attempting establish multiple conversation
sessions.
the chatting client has already initiated a conversation session. Note that the
term - conversation session - in this paper means the session established be-
tween a chatting client and myYearbook.com, but not the chatting session es-
tablished between two chatting clients. If there is no conversation session on a
chatting client, the Falsh code calls function setEnabledFlag(”videoReady”,!0)
and never() of Javascript codes. The function setEnabledFlag(”videoReady”,!0)
is invoked for establishing a conversation session on the chatting client, and
function nerve() is invoked for initiating a heartbeat for the current conver-
sation session and registers the conversation session on myYearbook.com. The
heartbeat of a conversation session on the chatting client side is maintained
by funtion nerve() and is periodically sent back to myYearbook.com for letting
myYearbook.com know that the conversation session is active. In the current
implementation, the heartbeat is sent back to myYearbook.com in every 5 sec-
onds. On the server side, every time when an up-to-date heartbeat is received,
Fig. 7. Multiple conversation session detection workflow. The purple lines describe the
entire detection process when a conversation session has existed.
the server (myYearbook.com) verifies the heartbeat. A conversation session is
terminated if the server does not receive a heartbeat from the chatting client.
In addition, the incorrect heartbeat sent from chatting client will be omitted.
When the conversation session is active, the chatting client is able to send match-
ing requests to myYearbook matching him/her with other chatting partners. The
heartbeat of a conversation session is also associated with each matching request
because the server needs to verify whether the matching request is legitimate or
fraudulent. The server responds to a matching request by returning chatting
partner’s corresponding information including IP address and UDP port, etc.
On the contrary, if the downloaded Flash code - MessageBridge.swf - detects
an existing conversation session on the chatting client, as shown in Figure 6,
MessageBridge.swf invokes the JavaScript funtion - onMultipleSessions() that
performs the following operations
1 a . behaviors . onMultipleSessions (
2 function ( ) {
3 setEnabledFlag ( ” n o tMu l t i p l e S e s s i o n s ” , ! 1 ) ;
4 nerve . close ( ) ;
5 $ . dragonAlert ( ”You can on l y cha t . . . . . . ” )
6 }
7 ) ;
First, onMultipleSessions() invokes setEnabledFlag(”notMultipleSessions”, !1)
that stops the chatting client establishing the second conversation session. It
then invokes nerve.close() to terminate the initialization of a heartbeat for the
second conversation session. Since myYearbook.com cannot receive a heartbeat
from the second conversation session, it fails to register the second conversation
session.
To determine whether a chatting client can establish a conversation ses-
sion, myYearbook harnesses Adobe Flash codes implemented in file Message-
Bridge.swf. We decompile MessageBridge.swf and thus dissect the process of
checking multiple conversation sessions. The major function of the Flash codes
is described as follows.
1 public function MessageBridge ( ) {
2 . . . . . .
3 this . sharedObjTimer = new
flash . ut i l s .Timer(SHAREDOBJUPDATEINTERVAL) ;
4 this . heartbeatTimer = new flash . ut i l s .Timer(60000) ;
5 . . . . . .
6 this . initSharedObj ( ) ;
7 }
8 internal function initSharedObj ( ) :Boolean {
9 . . . . . .
10 this . sharedObj =
f lash . net . SharedObject . getLocal ( ”myyearbook . com−MessageBr idge ” ,
”/” ) ;
11 this . sharedObj . f lush ( ) ;
12 . . . . . .
13 i f ( this . sharedObj . data .name === this . dynamicName) {
14 this . startSharedObjTimer ( ) ;
15 f lash . external . ExternalInterface . ca l l ( ” P l a t f o rm me s s a g eB r i d g e
16 r eady ” ) ;
17 }
18 else {
19 this . checkSharedObj ( ) ;
20 }
21 . . . . . .
22 }
23 internal function
checkSharedObj (arg1 : f lash . events .TimerEvent=null ) :Boolean {
24 var loc1 :∗=new Date ( ) ;
25 . . . . . .
26 i f ( loc1 . getTime ( ) − this . sharedObj . data . timestamp <
MULTIPLESESSIONSTHRESHOLD) {
27 i f (arg1 !== null ) {
28 f lash . external . ExternalInterface . ca l l ( ” P l a t f o rm me s s a g eB r i d g e
29 h a n d l eMu l t i p l e S e s s i o n s ” ) ;
30 }
31 else {
32 this . sharedObjTimer . delay = MULTIPLESESSIONSTHRESHOLD;
33 this . sharedObjTimer . addEventListener ( f lash . events .TimerEvent .
34 TIMER, this . checkSharedObj ) ;
35 this . sharedObjTimer . start ( ) ;
36 }
37 return fa l se ;
38 }
39 . . . . . .
40 }
MessageBridge() is the constructor of class MessageBridge. It is invoked when a
web browser loads MessageBridge.swf. MessageBridge() first initiates a timer for
a local shared object (LSO - a Flash cookie) and heartbeat. The constructor then
invokes internal funtion initSharedObj() to initiate an LSO for a current con-
versation session. In the LSO, a timestamp is stored and updated at a certain
update interval (SHARED OBJ UPDATE INTERVAL) until the current con-
versation session is terminated (i.e., chatting client shuts down its web browser).
To prevent multiple conversation sessions being established, funtion initShare-
dObj() also checks whether an LSO has already existed on a chatting client
(i.e., whether a local shared object file - myyearbook.com-MessageBridge.sol has
already existed). If the local shared object file has already existed, function
checkSharedObj() is invoked. Function checkSharedObj() examines whether the
timestamp in the existing local shared object file is up-to-date (i.e., the times-
tamp in the existing local shared object file only expired for less than MULTI-
PLE SESSIONS THRESHOLD milliseconds). If the timestamp in the existing
local shared object file is up-to-date, the existing conversation session will con-
tinue to be active, while the new initial conversation session will be terminated
by calling external JavaScript codes (which described above). To illustrate this,
Figure 7 shows the entire operation process of Adobe Flash codes.
Security Flaws In Figure 5, 6 and 7, several security flaws can be easily seen.
First, we recall that the Adobe Flash codes in MessageBridge.swf are mainly used
for detecting multiple conversation sessions on the chatting client. To initiate or
terminate a conversation session on the chatting client, the Flash codes need to
invoke external JavaScript codes. Since JavaScript source codes are both public
readable and writable, the JavaScript codes that perform conversation session
termination can be freely modified by a spammer. Therefore, even though Flash
codes in MessageBridge.swf detect multiple conversation sessions on a chatting
client, the spammer can substitute the conversation session termination opera-
tions with the conversation session initialization operations, and thus establish
multiple conversation sessions between the chatting client and myYearbook.com.
Fig. 8. Bypassing session based spam prevention by manipulating a LSO.
In addition to modifying JavaScript codes to bypass the session based spam
prevention mechanism on a chatting client, another approach is to fool Adobe
Flash operations. As shown in Figure 7, when a Flash program is executed in a
web browser, it first checks the local shared object that is stored on the chatting
client. If the timestamp stored in the local shared object file is up-to-date, this
implies that there is another conversation session active on the chatting client.
Current Adobe Flash implemention updates local shared object’s timestamp at
an interval of every 2 seconds. In other word, the time when a Flash program vis-
its the LSO is predictable. To establish multiple conversation sessions on a single
machine (i.e., spammers run multiple spam bot programs on a single machine),
spammers therefore need to deceive Flash codes and make function checkShare-
dObj() believe the timestamp in the local shared object has expired for more
than 2 seconds. To do this, we wrote an independent C program and used the
program to control the timestamp of the local shared object - myyearbook.com-
MessageBridge.sol. Figure 8 describes an example where a spammer fools two
Adobe Flash programs by manipulating the timestamp stored in a local shared
object. First, a spammer launches Flash program 1. When Flash program 1
starts, it writes its timestamp into a local shared object. Since Flash 1 visits
the LSO in every two seconds, a spammer can predict Flash program 1’s next
visit to the LSO. Using this characteristic, the spammer modifies the timestamp
stored in the LSO and changed the timestamp to an expired timestamp before
he launches Flash program 2. Since Flash program 2 sees an expired timestamp
in the LSO, Flash program 2 successfully starts and writes a new timestamp into
the LSO. To ensure Adobe Flash 1 still works, the spammer also needs to change
the timestamp in the LSO back to the timestamp that Flash program 1 stored
before Flash program 1 revisits the LSO. Because Flash programs’ visits to the
LSO are predictable. Therefore, a spammer can easily bypass spam prevention
mechanism. We verify the feasibility using our spam bot programs.
4.3 Discussion
Gianvecchio et al. [10] present a classification mechanism to distinguish chat
bots from human in the context of the Internet chat room. The classification
mechanism utilizes both chatting message size as well as inter-message delay
characteristics to distinguish chat bots from human chatters. Though this clas-
sification mechanism shows reasonable good classification performance, online
video chat websites still cannot obtain benefits from it because user’s text mes-
sages, video and audio messages are all transmitted through Adobe Flash’s peer-
to-peer networks and there is no trival method to obtain users’ chatting scripts
from a centrial point. In addition, image spam bots do not use text messages to
carry their spamming information, which may bypass the chat bot classification
approach.
5 Suggestions and Impacts
Based on our examination of two major spam prevention mechanisms, we pro-
vide some spam prevention suggestions for online video chat websites. First,
CAPTCHA based spam prevention is not suitable for online video chat websites
that do not have a sign-in requirement such as Chatroulette, Omegle etc., be-
cause there is no effective method to identify a specific suspected user. Sending
a CAPTCHA challenge to all the users behind the same NAT may harm legiti-
mate users’ experience. For those online video chat websites that require users’
registration such as myYearbook and vChatter, CAPTCHA based spam preven-
tion is a helpful mechanism if the scheme that triggers a CAPTCHA challenge
has reasonable low chance to mistakenly treat a legitimate user as a spammer
that runs tens of spam bots simultaneously.
Different from CAPTCHA based prevention, the session based spam pre-
vention mechanism, though having several security flaws, can be useful if some
improvements are added. The first suggestion for online video chat websites is to
obfuscate and encrypt their Flash program using commercial Flash protection
tools such as [7][13] etc., because a spammer may easily decompile their Flash
program, understand their program logic, and even remove spam prevention
functions from Flash program. Both Flash program obfuscation and encryption
can make reverse engineering and the removal of prevention function extemely
difficult. With the first assumption that our first suggestion implies (i.e., Flash
program’s obfuscation and encryption makes a Flash program unmodifiable),
our second suggest is to eliminate side channel attacks by integrating JavaScript
functions into a Flash program because JavaScript codes can be modified by
spammers. Finally, the most important suggestion for session based spam pre-
vention is to randomize the visit for a local shared object. Recall that a spammer
can easily predict the time when Flash programs visit a local shared object. Us-
ing this knowledge, a spammer can manipulate the content of the local shared
object, thus deceiving Flash programs to believe no other Flash programs are
executing at the same time. By randomizing the Flash programs’ visits to a
local shared object and incorporating first two suggestions, any online video
chat websites can sucessfully prevent multiple spam bot programs running on
the same machine. Finally, we also note that both CAPTCHA based or session
based spam prevention cannot completely eliminate the use of a single spam bot
in online video chat websites. However, these prevention mechanisms are still
useful for increasing spamming economic cost and reducing the number of spam
bots.
Since our spam bot experiments indicate that a majority of spam bots are
hosted on commercial cloud services, we report our study to both Chatroulette
and Omegle. Based on our study and report, both video chat websites have
already verified the spamming IP addresses that we report and blocked all the
IP address ranges that belong to Amazon.com, Rackspace.com, Slicehost.com
and Godaddy.com. The following is the comment from Leif K-Brooks - Omegle
CEO. Leif said: ”That’s surprising, and it’s useful information. Thank you! It
explains a lot about why spammers are so persistent...“. Up to the time when we
submit this paper, our one-hour consecutive observations from both Chatroulette
and Omegle indicate that no spams have been found.
6 Conclusion
This paper conducts several spam experiments on Chatroulette. Using a real
world data traces from Chatroulette along with our self-collected data traces,
we investigate and analyse spam in the context of online video chat services.
We find that spam on Chatroulette typically receives more attention than email
spam. Furthermore, we predicte the lower and upper bound for the number of
spam bots on Chatroulette. Motivated by our spam experiments, we also examine
online video chat websites’ spam prevention mechanisms. We find that most of
prevention mechanisms can be easily bypassed. We reported our study to both
Chatroulette and Omegle.
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